On Independence Day 2012
the National Geographic Channel presented a program called “The Real George
Washington” for the expressed purpose, in the fashion of the day, to dispel the
heroic myths surrounding Washington’s life and instead display how he was vain,
power hungry, and a bad general. The
charge of power hungry can be dealt with in a couple of sentences: The crown of
America was Washington’s for the taking following the Revolutionary War; all he
would have had to do was declare himself King and his officers, men, and the
public at large would have cheered at his coronation. King George III himself
stated that if Washington resisted placing the crown of America on his head he
would be “the greatest man of the age”. Washington went before Congress to
tender his resignation and then he went home. Coaxed out of retirement to participate in the
Constitutional Convention, he then became our first President and could have
been so for life had he chosen to run every four years, but instead he thought
it prudent to set the precedent of only running twice. Willingly giving up power for the sake of
one's country, not just once but twice, are not the actions of a power hungry
individual. Perhaps Washington was unusually hungry for fame and glory, but the
charge of power hungry is ridiculous.
I’ll stipulate to his
vanity - and thank the stars for it along with his hunger for glory – his
concern for the preservation of his sacred honor and his place in history was
his prime motivator in spending eight years of his life at war and in foregoing
the throne.
This leaves the charge
of poor generalship, or to quote the program, "mediocre tactician". That statement on its face is somewhat true,
at least early in the war, but the National Geographic Society seems content to
leave us with that simplistic evaluation of Washington's military abilities,
and the subject is far too complex for that. Certainly the Continental Army won few battles
under Washington’s command; and he was initially not an experienced commander having
previously commanded troops only briefly in the French and Indian war. His success in forcing the British evacuation
of Boston early in the war was largely because of innovative subordinates and
because the British really intended to leave anyway, and this nominal success
was followed by bitter defeats in a series of battles in New York and a
humiliating retreat across New Jersey into Pennsylvania followed by weeks of
just trying to elude the British and keep the army intact. It’s difficult to gauge Washington’s ability
as a tactician from these events, he was at such a numerical and tactical
disadvantage that perhaps the greatest of generals could have done little
better, but it was in the months following New York, between that summer of
Independence and Christmas of that year, 1776, that Washington began to evolve
into a brilliant strategist, a fact that The National Geographic Society virtually
ignores.
In order to understand
the evolution of Washington’s generalship one must understand the difference
between military tactics and military strategy.
Tactics is how to make use of terrain, manpower, equipment, the enemy's
weaknesses, & etc to win a battle; strategy is figuring out how to win the
war - tactics is how battles are won; strategy decides which battles to
fight. Washington made tactical mistakes
during those battles in New York, but not horrendous ones and not more than
many generals in many wars in many battles that were won; mostly he was simply
outgunned. His real mistake was in
fighting those battles to begin with, not because New York was not
strategically important, it was, but because the odds against winning were far
too great, and the consequences of losing too devastating. The fact that New York was virtually
surrounded by navigatable water put Washington at too much of a disadvantage;
he not only had to deal with General Howe’s army, but also the guns of Admiral
Howe’s fleet; only extremely fortuitous weather conditions prevented the fleet
from sailing up the Hudson River and destroying the Continental Army. Historians disagree to what extent this
strategic mistake can be blamed on Congress rather than Washington. Professor Allen C. Guelzo at Gettysburg
College states in his lecture series on the Revolution that Congress issued a
direct order to Washington to defend New York; David McCullough in his book 1776 states just the opposite; while Ron
Chernow in his biography titled Washington,
A Life tells of correspondence between Washington and Congress on the
subject, but without mention of a direct order.
What we know for sure is that Congress did exerted pressure on Washington
to defend New York even if there was no direct order to do so; John Adams
referred to it as “a kind of key to the whole continent” and stated that “no
effort to secure it ought to be omitted”; and we also know that Washington was
determined on his own to defend New York with or without an order from
Congress, so perhaps the point is moot. Fortunately
he was not too vain to learn from this mistake, and the strategic plan that
emerged was in fact a revelation - a singularly unique strategy suited to a
unique war: he could win the war without winning battles, or rather by winning
only a few strategic ones.
One can't say to what
degree Washington's long term strategy for the winning of the war had evolved
by the battles of Trenton and Princeton as 1776 became '77. What he knew leading up to crossing the
Delaware River on Christmas night to attack Trenton in the early morning was
that he had to have a victory. He didn't
need to gain and hold ground; he didn't need to defeat a huge British force;
but he had to put a battle in the win column or his horribly discouraged little
army was going to dwindle away, and by now he understood that it wasn't New
York or any other piece of ground that represented the hope of the infant United
States; it was the Continental Army. He
came to understand that he didn't have to win a lot of battles; he just needed
to keep his army intact; fight enough battles to be taken seriously, not give
the British free rein, and occupy his troops (armies that never fight are as
prone to desertion as armies that lose); win enough to keep morale in the army
high enough to minimize desertions and promote enlistments as well as
discourage enlistments in loyalist militia units; and outlast the British.
This strategy was
contrary to Washington's military personality which tended toward the
aggressive. He wanted to command a well
oiled military machine; he wanted to outsmart and outmaneuver his enemy, but
while his army’s discipline and abilities had improved over time from the
militia that he started with, and while many of the soldiers were veterans of
the French and Indian War, it was still primarily a citizen army, and while he displayed
moments of tactical brilliance he would never be a great tactician. Still, fighting a defensive war was not to his
liking, and he continued to hope for that one great victory that would turn the
tide and end the war quickly. He hoped
for it at the Brandywine river where his army was nearly equal in number to the
British force he opposed and his troops had the advantage of being well
entrenched as the enemy approached, but he was outmaneuvered and outflanked because he gave
undue credence to intelligence that fit what he already believed and discounted
intelligence to the contrary. So he was
forced to retreat and allow the enemy to march into his country's capital
rather than risk the extermination of his army; he could lose Philadelphia and
still hope to win the war if his army was intact. This was not the same general that had stubbornly
fought one losing battle after another in New York; he had learned from his
strategic mistakes, and following Brandywine Washington avoided battle except
on rare occasions when he had a numerically superior force or other tactical
advantage. Had he been ordered by Congress at this stage Washington would
probably have resigned rather than lead his army into another unwinnable
battle. His caution was not due to
concern for his personal safety; his courage under fire is documented multiple
times by multiple people in multiple battles in two wars. His concern was
always for the preservation of the Continental Army, the thread upon which the
hopes of the United States of America dangled.
Washington was not
directly involved in the decisive battles at Saratoga, New York that took place
nearly simultaneously with Brandywine and where a huge American victory was
enough to convince the French to ally themselves with the fledgling nation. He was, however, instrumental in that battle
from afar by keeping the main British army occupied so that it did not reinforce
the British army in the north, and because prior to the battle of Brandywine he
sent three of his best officers, General Benedict Arnold, General Benjamin
Lincoln, and Colonel Daniel Morgan with his regiment of sharp shooters to
assist the efforts to repel the British invasion from Canada. General Lincoln was instrumental in
destroying the British supply lines before the actual battles at Saratoga, and
the other two officers and their men played huge roles in those battles. Despite his later treachery, Benedict Arnold
was one of the bravest and most energetic of Continental officers, and is
considered to be the true hero of Saratoga. What a testimony to Washington as
Commander in Chief that he sent such valuable assets to assist an effort
hundreds of miles away when he knew that he would soon be in a major battle
himself. It’s interesting to speculate;
had Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan been guarding Washington’s right flank at
Brandywine rather than Horatio Gates’ left flank at Saratoga, if the outcomes
of those two battles might have been reversed.
Washington was not on
the battlefields in the Carolinas when the British chose to move the war south,
but for almost five years he worked his strategy, fighting few battles, winning
fewer, and keeping his army together until the great opportunity at Yorktown,
Virginia which some say he stumbled onto by accident and was really a victory
belonging to the French fleet who, by taking control of Chesapeake Bay, left
the British army without a means of resupply or evacuation. These points might
have some merit, but the fact remains that without Washington's patient,
strategic conduct of the war during those years of frustration for him and
depravation for his army there very likely would have been no Continental Army
to stumble onto the opportunity at Yorktown, and no United States of America
for the French to ally themselves with.
The fact remains that Washington commanded an ill equipped, ill fed army
that ultimately defeated the most powerful military force in the world.
If tactics and strategy
are two legs of a military tripod then the third is logistics. How is an army organized for best
effect? How is it fed, clothed and
equipped? How is it moved from place to
place? How is the morale and well-being
of the army maximized to the degree possible?
In these logistical areas
Washington also deserves high marks.
Perhaps he had a tendency to micro-manage, but a few examples show that it
was to good effect. He organized the army into brigades consisting of three or
more regiments rather than the traditional British system of each regiment
being an independent unit. While the
British threw regiments together into brigades under temporary commanders on an
ad hoc basis, permanent American brigades commanded by permanent brigadier
generals minimized confusion on the battlefield. Identifying regiments by State and lumping
soldiers together with neighbors and relatives applied peer pressure that
bolstered courage under fire; soldiers did not want to appear cowardly in front
of friends or folks that could tell of it back home. Insisting that the soldiers in the
Continental Army be vaccinated against smallpox at a time that vaccination was very
controversial probably avoided an epidemic that would have decimated the ranks.
Washington was at a huge
disadvantage when it came to transport of his army; the British could generally
hop on ships and be taken anyplace along the seaboard and often inland via navigable
rivers, but America had virtually no navy so Washington’s army had to move
overland. His ability to move his army
quickly under difficult conditions whether in retreat or to take advantage of
opportunity was remarkable.
Every school child knows
about the winter of deprivation at Valley Forge, but it was only one of many,
and perhaps not the worst of them.
Washington’s greatest challenge was not on the battlefield; it was in
keeping his army supplied with little or no help from the Continental Congress that
lacked the authority to tax and was therefore constantly short of money to
conduct the war. Washington resisted the temptation of simply taking provisions
from farmers and other citizens without something in the way of compensation –
often from his own pocket. The British
and their German hirelings were not so restrained. Thus Washington skillfully, wisely, and
successfully balanced the tremendously important strategic goal of keeping or swaying
public opinion in favor of the American cause against the logistical problem of
supplying his army.
Of course Washington was
aided in all of these areas by talented subordinates, but this only
demonstrates another of his logistical strengths – his ability to recognize talent
among very unlikely sources of officers.
At a time when birth into an
aristocratic family and the ability to purchase prestigious military commissions
was the normal means of selecting an officer corps in the British military, Washington
was able to find talented officers among book sellers, Quaker farmers, ministers,
and college dropouts.
One interesting way to
evaluate Washington as a general is to look at a couple of generals in somewhat
comparable situations since his time.
The obvious comparison is Robert E. Lee who was a brilliant tactician in
a losing cause. This evaluation is far
too simplistic and not quite fair – Lee was not in charge of all of the
southern armies and did not have strategic control of his war; Jefferson Davis
who considered himself a military genius held overall command and controlled
the “big picture” strategically. Neither
did Lee’s adversary have a communication line that included an ocean crossing.
What’s worth noting is that Lee’s two major defeats prior to Appomattox were
Antietam and Gettysburg – the two attempts at aggressively invading northern
territory. These decisions to invade the
north, whoever made them, might have had worthy political rational, but they
were strategic disasters. In the end
Lee’s amazing tactical brilliance in many battles (not including Gettysburg) could
not overcome the poor strategy under which the war was conducted.
A less obvious general
to compare to Washington is Ho Chi Minh who was a great admirer of Washington and
studied his military strategy. The
parallels are remarkable: a small citizen army on home turf fighting the most
powerful military in the world based an ocean away where popular support for
the war is never complete and wanes over time.
It’s interesting that Ho’s one major deviation from a Washington like
strategy was his coordinated attacks on several major cities in South Vietnam
in 1968 known at the Tet Offensive, a military blunder equivalent to
Gettysburg, but successful in that it tipped the scales of public opinion in
the United States away from supporting the war. Can Ho Chi Minh be credited
with so much wisdom that he knew that even in defeat a major attack would help
him win the war? It’s difficult to say;
but we can say that, like Washington, he understood that as long as he wasn't annihilated, he had a good chance of holding out to win the war when his enemy,
though undefeated, gave up and went home.
It's good that
historians continue to dig for historical truth in regard to the American
Revolution and our Founding Fathers, and it's true that Washington was the
subject of much myth and legend during his life and long after - myths that
should be dispelled and legends that should be challenged; but I question the
motives and honesty of those whose research seems predisposed to discover or
prove the negative or purposely ignore evidence of the positive in regard to
Washington and other American icons.
As a student and lover
of American history I hesitate when asked, “Who was the greatest President of
the United States”, the answer is not obvious and while Washington would certainly
be on the short list, mistakes made and some of the precedents set during his
Presidency have had negative effects ever since. But if asked, “Who was the greatest man who
ever became President of the United States”, then there is no hesitation; that
man was George Washington. There were
many amazing men in the Revolutionary crowd, but of only one can it be said,
“If that man had not existed at that time, there would be no United States of
America.” That man was General George
Washington.
